Russell (1961: 566):
In contrasting himself with Spinoza, Leibniz made much of the free will allowed in his system. He had a 'principle of sufficient reason', according to which nothings happens without a reason; but when we are concerned with free agents, the reasons for their actions 'incline without necessitating'. What a human being does always has a motive, but the sufficient reason of his action has no logical necessity.
Blogger Comments:
Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, 'will' is a desiderative mental process. Through interpersonal metaphor, desiderative mental processes can stand for inclinations and obligations (modulation).
On the other hand, reason is a type of cause, which is a type of enhancing relation within expansion. The notion of 'motive' can be interpreted as either reason or a distinct type of cause, namely: purpose.
Leibniz's doctrine is thus that desiderative mental processes are caused by reasons or purposes, but that desiderative mental processes involve inclination, not obligation.
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