Tuesday 31 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Spinoza In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 557):
Unlike some other philosophers, he not only believed his own doctrines, but practised them; … In controversy he was courteous and reasonable, never denouncing, but doing his utmost to persuade.

Monday 30 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Spinoza In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 554):
Finite things are determined by their boundaries, physical or logical, that is to say by what they are not: 'all determination is negation'.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, this relates to the notion of valeur in system networks.  The valeur of a feature is its relation to other features.  In a binary system, each feature is defined by its relation to the other.

In linguistics, this notion is attributed to Ferdinand de Saussure, who was said to be influenced in this regard by the philosopher William Hamilton, who believed that 'the mind could only grasp an idea by distinguishing it from something that it is not'.

(But compare Aristotle's P is ~[~P].)

Sunday 29 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [5]

Russell (1961: 550-1):
In two other respects the philosophy of Descartes was important.  First: it brought to completion, or very nearly to completion, the dualism of mind and matter which began with Plato and was developed, largely for religious reasons, by Christian philosophy. … the Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other.

Blogger Comments:

The experiential grammatics of Systemic Functional Linguistics distinguishes an 'inner' domain of mental processes from an 'outer' domain of material processes.  It is the inner domain that projects meaning, the semiotic order of experience, into "existence".

Saturday 28 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes In Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 550);
Descartes's indubitable facts are his own thoughts — using 'thought' in the widest possible sense.  'I think' is his ultimate premiss. … The decision, however, to regard thoughts rather than external objects as the prime empirical certainties was very important, and had a profound effect on all subsequent philosophy.

Blogger Comments:

In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, thoughts — intuitions about language, rather than instances of language — constitute the data for a theory that models knowledge of language, rather than language itself.

Friday 27 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics & Neural Darwinism

Russell (1961: 549):
This leads to a consideration of different kinds of ideas.  The commonest of errors, Descartes says, is to think that my ideas are like outside things.  (The word 'idea' includes sense-perceptions, as used by Descartes.)  Ideas seem to be of three sorts: (1) those that are innate, (2) those that are foreign and come from without, (3) those that are invented by me.  The second kind of ideas, we naturally suppose, are like outside objects … and it therefore seems reasonable to suppose that a foreign thing imprints its likeness on me. … The reasons for supposing that ideas of sense come from without are therefore inconclusive.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, "outside things" are meanings — phenomena — construed of experience.  This is not to deny the experience, merely to acknowledge that both "outside" and "things" are meanings construed of experience in language.

The grammar construes such phenomena as both the Agents and the Range of the perceptual mental processing of a Senser.

The view that "a foreign thing imprints its likeness on me" is known as instructionism.  According to the selectionist model of Gerald Edelman, the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, instructionism is not supported by an analysis of the data.  At the neuronal level, impacts of photons on the retina, for example, 'select' randomly neuronal groups in the visual cortex by strengthening their synaptic connections.  They are 'selected' in the sense that this makes more likely to fire as a unit in the future in discriminating visual inputs.

Thursday 26 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 549):
'I understand by the sole power of judgement, which resides in my mind, what I thought I saw with my eyes.'  Knowledge by the senses is confused, and shared with animals … .  Knowledge of external things must be by the mind, not by the senses.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, visual experience — the impact of photons on the retina — is construed as the ideational meaning of the system of language.  Other animals construe visual experience as the meanings of their systems of protolanguage.

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, knowledge is meaning.  Meaning is projected into semiotic existence by the cognitive or desiderative mental processing of a Senser.  Wording that realises meaning is projected into semiotic existence by the verbal processing of a Sayer.

Wednesday 25 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [4]

Russell (1961: 548):
'Thinking' is used by Descartes in a very wide sense.  A thing that thinks, he says, is one that doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, imagines, and feels — for feeling, as it occurs in dreams, is a form of thinking.  Since thought is the essence of mind, the mind must always think, even during deep sleep.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, Descartes 'thinking' includes verbal processes (affirms, denies) and three of the four types of mental process:
  1. cognition (doubts, understands, conceives, imagines)
  2. desideration (wills)
  3. emotion (feels).
His omission of the fourth type of mental process, perception, strategically supports the epistemology he wants to establish.

Tuesday 24 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 548):
Having now secured a firm foundation, Descartes sets to work to rebuild the edifice of knowledge.  The I that has been proved to exist has been inferred from the fact that I think, therefore I exist while I think, and only then.  If I ceased to think, there would be no evidence of my existence.  I am a thing that thinks, a substance of which the whole nature or essence consists in thinking, and which needs no place or material thing for its existence.  The soul, therefore, is wholly distinct from the body and easier to know than the body; it would be what it is even if there were no body.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, the 'I' that thinks is the Senser of a mental process.  Descartes limits the 'I' to the Medium of mental Processes, ignoring all the other process types that the 'I' participates in.  The evidence that the 'I' is simultaneously the Medium (Existent) of an existential Process is lost to the 'I' when the 'I' is not the Medium of a mental Process.  Existence, for Descartes, thus correlates with the unfolding of a mental process.

The conclusion that the Senser is wholly distinct from the body does not follow, of course, and the ideas that a Senser projects through mental Processes depend crucially the experience that has impacted on the body.

Monday 23 May 2016

The Subjectivist Thoughts Of Descartes In Formal Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 548):
'I think, therefore I am' makes mind more certain than matter, and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others.  There is thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference of what is known of the mind.  These two tendencies exist both in Continental idealism and in British empiricism — in the former triumphantly, in the latter regretfully.

Blogger Comments:

In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, it is not language that is modelled, but an ideal speaker's knowledge of language.

Sunday 22 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 547):
There remains, however, something that I cannot doubt: no demon, however cunning, could deceive me if I did not exist.  I may have no body: this might be an illusion.  But thought is different. 'While I wanted to think everything false, it must necessarily be that I who thought was something; and remarking that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so solid and so certain that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of upsetting it, I judged that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy that I sought'.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics: Descartes thought that he could doubt the existence of the Agent or Range (Phenomenon) of his own mental Process, but thought that he could not doubt the existence of the Medium (Senser) of his own mental Process.  That is, while he doubted the existence of the outer domain of material processes, he was certain of the existence of the inner domain of mental processes.

I
think
therefore
I
am
1
x 2
Senser
Process: mental

Existent
Process: existential


Cf. the following, in which interpersonal metaphor brings Cartesian certainty more in line with the uncertainty of quantum mechanics:

I
think
I
think
therefore
I
think
I
am
1
x 2
a
‘ b
a
‘ b
Senser
Process: mental
Senser
Process: mental

Senser
Process: mental
Existent
Process: existential
mood Adjunct: probability
Subject
Finite
Predicator

mood Adjunct: probability
Subject
Finite
probably
I
think
therefore
probably
I
am

Saturday 21 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Descartes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 546):
The theory [relating soul to body] appeared to have two merits.  The first was that it made the soul, in a sense, wholly independent of the body, since it was never acted on by the body.  The second was that it allowed the general principle: 'one substance cannot act on another'.  There were two substances, mind and matter, and they were so dissimilar that an interaction seemed inconceivable.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, the distinction between the "substances" of mind and matter is the distinction between the domains of mental processes and material processes.

Friday 20 May 2016

The Attitude Of Teachers In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 542):
There is a freshness about [Descartes'] work that is not to be found in any eminent previous philosopher since Plato.  All the intermediate philosophers were teachers, with the professional superiority belonging to that avocation.

Thursday 19 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Hobbes In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 536):
a doctrine repugnant to peace cannot be true.  (A singularly pragmatist view!)

Wednesday 18 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Hobbes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [4]

Russell (1961: 534):
He comes next to a consideration of the passions.  'Endeavour' may be defined as a small beginning of motion; if towards something, it is desire, and if away from something it is aversion.  Love is the same as desire, and hate is the same as aversion.  We call a thing 'good' when it is an object of desire, and 'bad' when it is an object of aversion. … Will is nothing but the last appetite or aversion remaining in deliberation.  That is to say, will is not something different from desire and aversion, but merely the strongest in a case of conflict.  This is connected, obviously, with Hobbes' denial of free will.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, desire and aversion are desiderative mental processes metaphorically reconstrued as things, whereas love and hate are emotive mental processes metaphorically reconstrued as things.

On the other hand, objects of desire or aversion are the phenomena of desiderative mental processes, and good and bad are emotive — not desiderative — qualities of projection (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 211).

Tuesday 17 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Hobbes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 533-4):
Hobbes, as might be expected, is an out-and-out nominalist.  There is, he says, nothing universal but names, and without words we could not conceive any general ideas.  Without language, there would be no truth or falsehood, for 'true' and 'false' are attributes of speech.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, ideas are the mental projections of language users, which may be verbally projected as locutions.  Meanings of language such as 'true' and 'false' are both construals of experience (ideational) and enactments of social relations (interpersonal).

Monday 16 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Hobbes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 533):
Sensations are caused by the pressure of objects; colours, sounds, etc., are not in the objects.  The qualities in objects that correspond to our sensations are motions.

Blogger Comments:

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

… what is being construed by the brain is not the environment as such, but the impact of that environment on the organism and the ongoing material and semiotic exchange between the two.
On the other hand, on the SFL model, objects are construals of experience to which qualities are assigned.

Sunday 15 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Hobbes In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 533):
[Hobbes] proclaims at the very beginning of the book [Leviathan], his thoroughgoing materialism.

Blogger Comments:

Systemic Functional Linguistics is theorised from a broadly materialist position.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 608-9):

… the human brain has evolved in the construction of a functioning model of “reality”.  We prefer to conceptualise “reality construction” in terms of construing experience.  This is not so much because it avoids metaphysical issues about the ultimate nature of reality — we are prepared to acknowledge a broadly materialist position;

Saturday 14 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Francis Bacon In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 527, 528):
Bacon's most important book, The Advancement of Learning, is in many ways remarkably modern.  He is commonly regarded as the originator of the saying 'Knowledge is power', and though he may have had predecessors who said the same thing, he said it with new emphasis.  The whole basis of his philosophy was practical: to give mankind mastery over the forces of nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions.
… he objected to any admixture of teleological explanation in the actual investigation of phenomena; everything, he held, should be explained as following necessarily from efficient causes. 

Blogger Comment:

The 'genre pedagogy' wing of the SFL community has twice used the slogan Language is social power, so its concern is not so much with 'mastery over the forces of nature' as with 'mastery over each other'.  However, in contradistinction to Bacon, the theory which informs genre pedagogy takes a teleological perspective on text function.

Friday 13 May 2016

The Teleological Thoughts Of Aristotle In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 523):
Another thing that resulted from science was a profound change in the conception of man's place in the universe. … Moreover purpose, which had since Aristotle formed an intimate part of the conception of science, was now thrust out of scientific procedure. … The world might have a purpose, but purposes could no longer enter into scientific explanations.

Blogger Comment:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, Martin's Genre Theory derives from a 'teleological perspective on text function'.  However, although Systemic Functional Linguistics is a scientific theory, Genre Theory is neither consistent with Systemic Theory nor scientific, and Martin has made no secret of his contempt for "scientists".

Thursday 12 May 2016

The Scientific Attitude In the SFL Community

Russell (1961: 514):
the scientific attitude: it is not what the man of science believes that distinguishes him, but how and why he believes it.  His beliefs are tentative, not dogmatic; they are based on evidence, not on authority or intuition. … the test of a scientific truth is patient collection of facts, combined with bold guessing as to laws binding the facts together.

Wednesday 11 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Machiavelli In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 494):
'But it is necessary to be able to disguise the character well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived.'

Tuesday 10 May 2016

Mediæval Dogmatism In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 480):
There is yet another difference from ecclesiastical authority, which declares its pronouncements to be absolutely certain and eternally unalterable: the pronouncements of science are made tentatively, on the basis of probability, and are regarded as liable to modification.  This produces a temper of mind very different from that of the mediæval dogmatist.

See related post here.

Monday 9 May 2016

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [4]

Russell (1961: 464-5):
To the question 'whether the sensitive soul and the intellective soul are really distinct in man', he answers that they are, though this is hard to prove.  One of his arguments is that we may with our appetites desire something which with our understanding we reject; therefore appetite and understanding belong to different subjects.  Another argument is that sensations are subjectively in the sensitive soul, but not subjectively in the intellective soul.  Again, the sensitive soul is extended and material, while the intellective soul is neither.

Blogger Comments:

Here the sensitive soul is aligned with appetites, and the intellective soul with understanding.  In Systemic Functional Linguistics, these correspond to the two core mental processes of sensers: desideration and cognition, the only mental processes that project ideas.  Desiderative processes project hopes and desires, whereas cognitive processes project thoughts.

Sunday 8 May 2016

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 464-5):
The object of sense and the object of understanding are the same, but the individual is the first object of sense. …  He goes on to say that abstract knowledge always presupposes knowledge which is 'intuitive' (i.e. of perception), and this is caused by individual things. … The question involved is whether, or how far, perception is the source of knowledge.

Blogger Comments;

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, 'the object of sense' is a perceptual phenomenon (the range of a perceptual mental process), whereas 'the object of understanding' is a cognitive phenomenon (the range of a cognitive mental process).

Further, perceptual experience is construed as linguistic meaning, and it is linguistic meaning that is projected by cognitive  (and desiderative) mental processes.

Saturday 7 May 2016

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 464):
Understanding is of things, not of forms produced by the mind; these are not what is understood, but that by which things are understood.  Universals, in logic, are only terms or concepts predicable of many other terms or concepts.  Universalgenusspecies are terms of second intention, and therefore cannot mean things. … A universal is merely a sign of many things.

Blogger Comments:

The contrast here is between external things and internal forms in the mind, with the latter being the means by which the former are understood.  This shares some common ground with the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistics, which contrasts outer experience with inner meaning, with the latter being the means by which the former is understood.

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, things and universals are both meanings — construed of experience — and the relation between them is one of class membership: carrier to attribute.

Friday 6 May 2016

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 463):
Terms which point at things are called 'terms of first intention'; terms which point at terms are called 'terms of second intention'.


Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, this is the distinction between (first-order) language and (second-order) metalanguage (language about language).

Thursday 5 May 2016

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 463):
A concept is a natural sign, a word is a conventional sign.  We must distinguish when we are speaking of the word as a thing, and when we are using it as having meaning.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, the relation between meaning and wording is said to be natural, while the relation between wording and expression is conventional.  It is the expression of a word that is conventional, as opposed to natural.

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, a word is both a thing — a construal of experience — and a realisation of meaning.

Wednesday 4 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Duns Scotus In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 458):
The 'principle of individuation' [i.e. that which makes one thing not identical with another] was one of the important problems of the scholastic philosophy.  In various forms, it has remained a problem to the present day.

Tuesday 3 May 2016

The Thoughts Of Duns Scotus In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 456):
There are, he says, four causes of ignorance: First, the example of frail and unsuited authority. Second, the influence of custom. Third, the opinion of the unlearned crowd. Fourth, the concealment of one's ignorance in a display of apparent wisdom.

Monday 2 May 2016

The Nominalist Thoughts Of Abélard Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 430):
[Abélard's] chief importance is in logic and theory of knowledge.  His philosophy is a critical analysis, largely linguistic.  As for universals, i.e. what can be predicated of many different things, he holds that we do not predicate a thing, but a word.  In this sense he is a nominalist.  But as against Roscelin he points out that a 'flatus vocis' is a thing; it is not a word as a physical occurrence that we predicate, but the word as meaning.  Here he appeals to Aristotle.  Things, he says, resemble each other, and these resemblances give rise to universals.  But the point of resemblance between two similar things is not itself a thing; this is the mistake of realism.


Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, a thing is a construal of experience as meaning, which may be realised as a word.  In the first instance, it is perceptual experience that is construed as meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):
… what is being construed by the brain is not the environment as such, but the impact of that environment on the organism and the ongoing material and semiotic exchange between the two.
In terms of 'what can be predicated of many things' — i.e. the classes (Attributes) that members (Carriers) can be ascribed to — these can be things or qualities, both of which are construals of experience as meanings.

Sunday 1 May 2016

Scholasticism In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 428):
The defects of the scholastic method are those that inevitably result from laying stress on 'dialectic'.  These defects are: indifference to facts and science, belief in reasoning in matters which only observation can decide, and an undue emphasis on verbal distinctions and subtleties.  These defects we had occasion to mention in connection with Plato, but in the scholastics they exist in a much more extreme form.