Friday, 15 July 2016

The Logical Thoughts Of Russell On Kant Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 679):
[For Kant] a 'synthetic' proposition is one that is not analytic. All the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic. … But Kant, unlike Leibniz and all other previous philosophers, will not admit the converse, that all synthetic propositions are only known through experience.
Blogger Comment:

In presenting the following pair of propositions as converse:
  1. all the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic
  2. all synthetic propositions are only known through experience
Russell is construing them, from the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, as two attributive clauses:

1.
All the propositions that we know only through experience
are
synthetic
Carrier
Process
Attribute
Subject
Finite
Complement
Mood
Residue

The above construes all the propositions that we know only through experience as members of the class synthetic.

2.
All synthetic propositions
are
only
known through experience
Carrier
Process

Attribute
Subject
Finite
Adjunct: counterexpectancy: limiting
Complement
Mood
Residue

The above construes all synthetic propositions as members of the class (only) known through experience.


However, this second construal varies slightly from the grammar of the clause, as worded:

2a.
All synthetic propositions
are
only
known
through experience
Phenomenon
Process:

mental
Manner: means
Subject
Finite
Adjunct: counterexpectancy: limiting
Predicator
Adjunct
Mood
Residue

The above construes all synthetic propositions as Phenomena of one means of cognitive mental processing.

Thursday, 14 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Kant Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 679):
[For Kant] a 'synthetic' proposition is one that is not analytic.  All the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic.  We cannot, by mere analysis of concepts, discover such truths as 'Tuesday was a wet day' or 'Napoleon was a great general'.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, all propositions are instances of interpersonal potential; and all the propositions that we know are ideas projected by sensers engaged in mental processes.  For propositions, the scale between positive and negative polarity is modalisation: degrees of probability or usuality.

Wednesday, 13 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Kant Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 679):
[For Kant] an 'analytic' proposition is one in which the predicate is part of the subject; for instance, 'a tall man is a man', or 'an equilateral triangle is a triangle'.  Such propositions follow from the law of contradiction; to maintain that a tall man is not a man would be self-contradictory.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, these analytic propositions are statements of class membership, realised by attributive declarative clauses.

Carrier
Process
Attribute
a tall man
is
a man
an equilateral triangle
is
a triangle
Subject
Finite
Complement
Mood
Residue

That is:
  • a tall man is a member of the class a man
  • an equilateral triangle is a member of the class a triangle
Viewed at group rank:

a
tall
man
=
a
man
Deictic
Epithet
Thing
Deictic
Thing

an
equilateral
triangle
=
a
triangle
Deictic
Classifier
Thing
Deictic
Thing

That is:
  • a sub-classified Thing is a member of the class Thing

Tuesday, 12 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Kant Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 679):
Kant's most important book is The Critique of Pure Reason.  The purpose of this work is to prove that, although none of our knowledge can transcend experience, it is, nevertheless, in part a priori and not inferred inductively from experience.  The part of our knowledge which is a priori embraces, according to him, not only logic, but much that cannot be included in logic or deduced from it.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional linguistic theory, all ideational meaning — including a priori knowledge — is a construal of experience as meaning.  Kant's a priori knowledge derives from bringing to consciousness — as mental or verbal instances of registers — those relations that are inherent in the meaning construed of experience.

Monday, 11 July 2016

The Thoughts Of The German Idealists Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 677):
There are certain common characteristics of the German idealists, which can be mentioned before embarking on greater detail. … There is an emphasis upon mind as opposed to matter, which leads in the end to the assertion that only the mind exists.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the opposition of mind vs matter is a semiotic distinction; it is a distinction within the semiotic system of language.  That is, the distinction is a construal of experience as meaning.  Being, including existing, applies to both domains of construal: the outer (material) domain of doing–&–happening and the inner (conscious) domain of sensing and saying.

Sunday, 10 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Russell On Hume Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 676):
It is true that, like Locke, [Hume] admitted no simple idea without an antecedent impression, and no doubt he imagined an 'impression' as a state of mind directly caused by something external to the mind.  But he could not admit this as a definition of 'impression', since he questioned the notion of 'cause'.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, in the construal of experience as meaning, in terms of logico-semantic relations, the identifying relation between tokens of experience and semiotic values is not causal — cause being a subtype of enhancement — but elaborating (intensive).

However, when the direction of coding is encoding — that is, when semiotic values are encoded by reference to tokens of experience — the experiential tokens are the cause (agent) of the identifying relation.  On the other hand, when the direction of coding is decoding — that is, when experiential tokens are decoded by reference to semiotic values — there is no agency: the identifying process is self-engendered.

encoding meaning:
experience
becomes/turns into
meaning
Identifier Token
Process: relational: identifying: intensive
Identified Value
Agent
Medium

decoding experience:
experience
becomes/turns into
meaning
Identified Token
Process: relational: identifying: intensive
Identifier Value
Medium
Range

Saturday, 9 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Berkeley In Systemic Functional Linguistics [7]

Russell (1961: 675):
For [Berkeley], there are only minds and ideas; the physical external world is abolished.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, minds, ideas and the physical external world are all construals of experience as meaning.

Mind is the construal of experience as
  • the inner domain of a senser sensing (mental processes) and a sayer saying (verbal processes). 

Ideas are the construal of experience as
  • the meanings that are projected by a senser sensing, and
  • the meanings that are realised by the wordings projected by a sayer saying.

The physical external world is the construal of experience as
  • the outer material domain of doings, happenings, and the relations between them.

Friday, 8 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Locke In Systemic Functional Linguistics [6]

Russell (1961: 675):
Locke says … 'Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.'

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, thoughts, reasonings, ideas, knowledge are names of meaning.  Meaning is a semiotic construal of experience.  That is, meaners assign semiotic values to experiential tokens, cognitively and verbally.  Meaning is "in" the semiotic values thus assigned, not "in" the tokens of experience that realise semiotic values.  This is the sense in which meaning is 'immanent' rather than 'transcendent'.

Thursday, 7 July 2016

The Subjectivist Thoughts Of British Empiricists Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961):
Philosophy in the eighteenth century was dominated by the British empiricists, of whom Locke, Berkeley, and Hume may be taken as their representatives. … But while their temper was social, their theoretical philosophy led to subjectivism.  This was not a new tendency; it had existed in late antiquity, most emphatically in St Augustine; it was revived in modern times by Descartes' cogito, and reached a momentary culmination in Leibniz's windowless monads.

Blogger Comment:

The subjectivism of the British empiricists contrasts with the 'intersubjectivism' at the heart of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 2):
This perspective leads us to place less emphasis on the individual than would be typical of a cognitivist approach; unlike thinking and knowing, at least as these are traditionally conceived, meaning is a social, intersubjective process. If experience is interpreted as meaning, its construal becomes an act of collaboration, sometimes of conflict, and always of negotiation.

Wednesday, 6 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Russell On Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 646-7):
Hume's scepticism rests entirely upon his rejection of the principle of induction.  The principle of induction, as applied to causation, says that, if A has been found very often accompanied or followed by B, and no instance is known of A not being accompanied or followed by B, then it is probable that on the next occasion on which A is observed it will be accompanied or followed by B.  If the principle is to be adequate, a sufficient number of instances must make the probability not far short of certainty.  If this principle, or any other from which it can be deduced, is true, then the causal inferences which Hume rejects are valid, not indeed as giving certainty, but as giving sufficient probability for practical purposes.  If this principle is not true, every attempt to arrive at general scientific laws from particular observations is fallacious, and Hume's scepticism is inescapable for an empiricist.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the relation between frequency in the data and probability in the theory is one of instantiation.

Carrier
relation: ascription + elaboration
Attribute
instance
‘instantiates’
potential
frequency
‘instantiates’
probability
data
‘instantiates’
theory


That is, 'general scientific laws', as theories, are potential probabilities that are instantiated by actual frequencies in the data they account for.  In other words, theoretical certainty is proportional to frequency in the data.  This relation is implicit in Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in Quantum Mechanics, where a distribution of (location) frequencies in the data is theorised as a wave of (location) probability.

This, in turn, reflects the interpersonal dimension of meaning, from which perspective, a theory is a modalised macro-proposition.  That is, 'general scientific laws' entail modalisation: probability and usuality, rather than modulation (obligation nor inclination).  The (material) universe does not "obey" the (semiotic) laws of physics.

Tuesday, 5 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [11]

Russell (1961: 645):
'Carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy [for sceptical doubt both with respect to reason and the senses].  For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded that there is both an external and internal world.'

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, as meaners, we construe experience as both external and internal, with
  • the external as the domain of doing-&-happening
  • the internal as the domain of sensing and saying, and 
  • both the external and internal as the domain of being-&-having.

Monday, 4 July 2016

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [10]

Russell (1961: 644-5):
'The sceptic,' he continues (Book I, part iv, sec. ii), 'still continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of a body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity … We may well ask, what causes us to believe in the existence of a body?  But 'tis vain to ask, whether there be body or not?  That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.'

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of SFL theory, beliefs are construals of experience as meaning.  Hume's argument is that these cannot be held with certainty.  SFL theory suggests, through metaphors of modality, that, interpersonally, probability may be a feature of all projected meaning.

I think
that
‘s
true
Modality: probability
Subject
Finite
Complement
Mood
Residue